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FIVE TO FOUR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DECISIONS
The United States Constitution like all other written consti-
tutions is confined to the fundamentals. Chief Justice Marshall
in one of his decisions said: "A constitution, from its nature,
deals in generals, not in details. Its framers cannot perceive
minute distinctions which arise in the progress of the nation, and
therefore confine it to the establishment of broad and general
principles."'
The work of filling in the details left open by the United
States constitution has been partly accomplished by the action of
congress in enacting the large body of federal statutes, but this
work has been done to a probably equal degree by the federal
courts in their interpretation of the various clauses of the con-
stitution. The latter work has been, in a way, of a higher order
than the former. The acts of congress are but "statutory law,"
while, since the authoritative interpretation put upon written
law, either constitutional or statutory, by the courts, becomes, as
it were, a part of the written law which interpretates, the decisions
of our courts interpreting the United States constitution,
becomes a part of our constitutional law. No amount of study
of the text of the United States constitution can bring to the
lawyer any satisfactory knowledge of constitutional law, unless
the study of the text is supplemented by the study of the judicial
decisions interpreting the same.
The authoritative interpreter of the United States constitution
is the United States supreme court. When this court has once
passed upon a question arising under the federal constitution
this question is settled and all departments and officers of the
national government, all state governments, and all citizens of
the United States are bound thereby.
It is very generally understood that the final decision as to the
meaning of any clause of the United States constitution or as to
the constitutionality (under the United States constitution) of
any federal or state statute rests with the nine justices of the
United States supreme court. What is not so generally appreci-
ated, however, is how often during the past half century such
decision has rested upon the decision of a single justice.
'United States Bank v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 87.
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It is a startling statement, but nevertheless an absolutely correct
one, that the large majority of the most important constitutional
law questions which have come before the United States supreme
court since the beginning of the Civil War have been decided by
a majority of one in the vote of the justices of the United States
supreme court. In a dozen or more cases the change of the vote
of one justice would have changed permanently in some import-
ant respect, the construction given to the constitution, and in some
of these cases such a change would have had a far-reaching
effect upon the future history of the United States. It is the
purpose of this article to simply call attention to the most im-
portant of the recent "five to four" decisions of the United
States supreme court upon questions of constitutional law.
We begin with the Prize Cases2 which passed upon the legality
of the capture of the brig Amy Warwick, the schooners Cren-
shaw and Brilliante, and bark Hiawatha, and in which mixed
questions of international and constitutional law were involved.
While the former element predominated there was a sufficient
.element of the latter to justify the inclusion of this case in this
article. The decision in all four of the Prize Cases depended
upon'the answer to two questions, stated by the supreme court
in their decision as follows:
"First-Had the President the right to institute a block-
ade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion
against the government, on the principles of international
law, as known and acknowledged among civilized States?
Second-Was the property of persons domiciled or resid-
ing within those States a proper subject of capture on the
sea as 'enemies' property?"
Or differently stated, the question was whether the United
States government had the right to refuse to recognize the Con-
federate States as having the rights of belligerents, and at the
same time employ against the portions of the United States which
were in actual rebellion all those methods of warfare which it
could have exerted against the territories of any foreign country
with which the United States might have been at war.
By a vote of five to four the supreme court of the United
States decided both of these cases in favor of the government,
and upheld the legality of the capture of the four ships. The
22 Black 635.
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importance of the decision in the Prize Cases is apt to be under-
estimated. If the supreme court had declared the seizures of
these ships to have been illegal, it would have also decided that
this country had illegally seized many ships belonging to citizens
of England and France. Such a decision at that time would have
most seriously affected the relations between the United States
and France and England, and would have embarrassed the con-
duct of the war, and might have caused its ultimate failure.
That a decision adverse to the government had been a dangerous
probability is shown by the fact that the four judges who dis-
sented from the decision had constituted a majority of the court
as it was composed before the appointment of two new justices
of the court which had taken place very shortly before this
decision was rendered.
The question of the power of congress to make United States
treasury notes, colloquially known as "greenbacks," a legal
tender in payment of preexisting debts, was one which proved
to be so particularly troublesome to our supreme court, that
before they finally disposed of the problem they decided it
three different ways. It is not surprising therefore, that two
of these decisions were rendered by a bare majority of the court.
Hepburn v. Griswold3 was strictly speaking a "four to three"
decision instead of a "five to four" one, there being two vacan-
cies in the membership of the supreme court at the time the
decision was rendered. In the decision in this case the act making
treasury notes legal tender was held to be unconstitutional in so
far as it applied to the payment of debts which antedated the
passage of the act. Justices Miller, Swayne, and Davis dissented.
The two vacancies on the supreme court were filled upon the
7th of February, 187o, the same day upon which the decision of
the court in Hepburn v. Griswold was rendered. This same ques-
tion as to the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts came
up again before the supreme court, with its increased member-
ship the following year in the cases of Knox v. Lee and Parker
v. Davis.4 The result of these cases was a reversal of the deci-
sion in Hepburn v. Griswold and a decision in favor of the con-
stitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts, such decisions being based
mainly on the ground of expediency and public necessity, and
upheld as a proper and necessary war measure.
'8 Wall. 603.
'12 Wall. 457.
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Chief Justice Chase and Justices Clifford, Field and Nelson
dissented from the decision in these cases. The justices included
in the "five" who constituted the majority were the three justices
who dissented in Hepburn v. Griswold and the two new justices
appointed on Feb. 7, 1870. The third of the legal tender deci-
sions, that in Julliard v. Greenman,5 was not a "five to four"
decision and therefore falls without the scope of this article.
The first important decision by the supreme court of the United
States relative to the meaning and application of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States constitution, was that rendered
in the Slaughter House Cases.6 These cases involved the consti-
tutionality of an act of the legislature of Louisiana entitled "An
Act to protect the health of the city of New Orleans, to locate
the stocklandings and slaughter-houses, and to incorporate the
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Com-
pany" which prohibited the landing or slaughtering of animals
whose flesh was intended for food, within the city of New
Orleans and other parishes and boundaries named and defined, or
the keeping or establishing any slaughter-house or abattoirs
within these limits, except by the corporation thereby created, and
which made it the duty of said company to permit any person to
slaughter animals in their slaughter-houses under a heavy penalty
for each refusal. The statute was alleged to be a violation of
the constitution of the United States (i. e., of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments) in the four following particulars:
(i) That it created an involuntary servitude forbidden
by the thirteenth amendment;
(2) That it abridged the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States.
(3) That. it denied to the plaintiffs in the case the equal
protection of the laws;
(4) That it deprived them of their property without due
process of law.
By a "five to four" vote the court sustained the constitution-
ality of the Louisiana statute, on all points. The dissenting
members of the court, in these cases, were Chief Justice Chase,
and Justices Field, Bradley and Swayne, all of whom, except
the Chief Justice, prepared individual dissenting opinions.
II0 U. S. 421.
16 Wall. 36.
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In 1895 the constitutionality of the income tax provisions of the
Tariff Act of August 15, 1894, was twice argued before the
United States supreme court. On April 8, 1895, the court, one
justice being absent, decided in the cases of Pollock v. Farmers
Loan and Trust Company and Hyde v. Continental Trust
Company7 that:
"A tax on the rates or income of real estate is a direct
tax within the meaning of the term as used in the con-
stitution of the United States.
"A tax upon income derived from the interest of bonds
issued by a municipal corporation is a tax upon the power
of the state and its instrumentalities to borrow money and
is repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
Upon each of the other questions argued at bar, to-wit:
"i. Whether the void provision as to rent and income
invalidates the whole act? 2. Whether as to the income
from personal property as such, the act is unconstitutional,
as laying direct taxes? 3. Whether any part of the tax,
if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for want of
uniformity on either of the grounds suggested? The
justices who heard the argument were equally divided,
and, therefore, no opinion is expressed
Upon a second hearing8 held before a full court, the entire law
on May 20, 1895, was declared unconstitutional by a "five to
four" vote. There was one feature with relation to the vote of
the justices on the second hearing of the case which calls for
particular mention. Justice Brown, who had been absent at the
first hearing, voted to sustain the constitutionality of the fact, but
Justice Shiras, who at the first hearing had supported the con-
stitutionality of the act, at the second hearing, six weeks later,
reversed his own opinion and by voting against the constitutional-
ity of the act made the necessary "fifth" vote to throw the victory
to that side of the controversy. The dissenting justices in this
case in addition to Justice Brown were Justices Harlan, Jackson
and White.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association was a
"five to four" interstate commerce decision, the substance of
which was to the effect that an agreement in restraint of trade
could not be upheld by proving that the restraint was reasonable.
7 157 U. S. 586.
a 158 U. S. 6Ol.
9166 U. S. 29o.
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Justices White, Field, Gray and Shiras made up the dissenting
quartette on this occasion.
The climax of dissenting opinions was reached in the so-called
"Insular Decisions" which together fill the greater part of the
182nd volume. The combined decisions in the cases of DeLima
v. Sidwell'0 and Downes v. Bidwell 1 fix the status of the colonial
possessions of the United States. Four justices dissented from
the first of these two decisions, and four different justices from
the other. Justice Brown was the only member of the court to
vote with the majority in both cases. The status of Porto Rico
and the Philippines may thus be said to have been determined
not by the vote of five justices but by the vote of one.
The case of De Lima v. Bidwell was an action brought by
De Lima against Bidwell, the collector of the port of New York,
to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted and
paid under protest upon certain importations of sugar from San
Juan in the Island of Porto Rico, during the autumn of 1899,
and subsequent to the cession of the Island to the United States.
The court held that the question as to whethet these cargoes of
sugar were subject to duty depended solely upon the question
whether Porto Rico was a "foreign country" at the time that the
sugar was shipped, since the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, then
in force, under which it was claimed that the duties were col-
lectable, provided that, "there shall be levied, collected and paid
upon all articles imported from foreign countries" certain duties.
Five justices constituting the majority said: "We are there-
fore of the opinion that at the time these duties were levied
Porto Rico was not a foreign country within the meaning of
the tariff laws but a territory of the United States, that the duties
were illegally exacted, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover them back."
The dissenting justices were McKenna, Shiras, White and
Gray.
The most important of the insular cases was that of Downes
v. Bidwell. The direct question in this case was whether con-
gress had the power to lay duties on articles imported into the
colonies of the United States, or upon articles exported from the
colonies of the United States to the United States. The ultimate
question involved was whether the term United States included
"182 U. S. I.
"182 U. S. 244.
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the territories and colonies of the United States. A majority
of the court decided that congress had power to lay and collect
such duties and that the term United States as used in the con-
stitution only included the territory of the different States. The
five judges holding this view differed widely from each other
as to the reasons for it. Opinions were delivered by three of
the judges of the majority-Mr. justice Brown, Mr. Justice
White, and Mr. Justice Gray. Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr.
justice Shiras concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice White.
Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan, Brewer and Peckham
dissented.
Another case decided the same day was that of Dooley v.
United States,12 which involved the right of the United States
under the war power, after the signing of the treaty of peace
to collect taxes of imports into Porto Rico from the United
States. The majority of the court held that as the right to
exact duties upon importations from Porto Rico to the United
States ceased with the ratification of the treaty of peace, the
correlative right to exact duties upon imports from the United
States to Porto Rico also ceased at the same time. The same
judges dissented from the opinion in this case as from that in
De Lima v. Bidwell.
Although Justice Brown alone of all the nine justices of the
court believed in the correctness of all the decisions in the
"Insular Cases" it is probable that the views of Justice Brown
were entirely correct and that the supreme court will never
change the rulings laid down in these cases.
The question whether, when congress is prohibited generally
from legislating on any particular subject or from doing any
particular act (as is the case with the restrictions contained in
the first eight amendments and part of those in the ninth section
of the first article of the constitution) such restriction would act
as a limitation of the power of congress over the territory belong-
ing to the United States, as well as over the United States itself,
is one which after having been the occasion of much discussion
was finally passed upon by the supreme court in the year 1903,
in the case of Hawaii v. Mankichi." This case involved the
legality of the conviction of Osald Manldchi, a murderer in
Hawaii, who had not been indicted by a grand jury, and who had
been convicted by a majority instead of by a unanimous vote of
21 82 U. S. 222.
13 19o U. S. 197.
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the trial jury, after the islands had been annexed to the United
States, but before they were formally incorporated into a terri-
tory. The provision in the United States constitution requiring
a trial by jury, is held to require the old common law method of
trial jury, the unanimous verdict of a jury of twelve men. The
Hawaiian law required no grand jury indictment, and permitted
a majority of the trial jury to convict. The Newlands Resolu-
tion annexing the islands provided that: "The municipal legisla-
tion of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of
treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint
resolution nor contrary to the constitution of the United States,
nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in
force until the congress of the United States shall otherwise
determine."
The question presented to the supreme court was whether the
conviction by a majority of the jury, while Hawaiian laws still
applied, was contrary to the American constitutional provisions.
By a vote of five to four the court decided that the conviction
by a majority of the jury was legal. This is a decision to the
effect that the United States "Bill of Rights" is only in force in
the United States itself, and does not apply to territory belonging
to the United States.
The dissenting opinion in this case was rendered by Chief
Justice Fuller with whom concurred justices Harlan, Brewer
and Peckham. In this case the effect of the vote of a single
justice was to deprive millions of people of the protection secured
by the constitutional right to a trial by jury.
Although Dorr v. United States was not nominally a five to
four decision, it was one for all practical purposes. The ques-
tion involved in this case was that of the right of a trial by jury
in the Philippine Islands. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting
opinion which is entitled to a place among the ablest expositions
of a constitutional law question ever rendered by any of the
justices of the supreme court of the United States. No other
justice formally dissented but the Chief Justice and Justices
Peckham and Brewer placed on record the fact that they con-
sidered the decision rendered by the majority of the court to
be an erroneous interpretation of the constitution, and that they
only refrained from dissenting because they held that on account
of the previous decision of the court in the case of Hawaii v.
Mankichi, the doctrine of stare decisis should be applied in the
determination of the case.
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One more case relative to the civil rights of the residents in
the colonies of the United States remains to be considered. This
is the case of Kepner v. United States,"4 decided in 1904. This
case involved the subject of double jeopardy. Under the Spanish
law in force in the Philippines the government as well as the
accused had the right to appeal in criminal cases. Under the
American military government of the islands this right was
continued in force together with nearly all of the other Spanish
rules of criminal procedure. The Act of Congress of July i,
19o2, "for the administration of the affairs of civil government in
the Philippine Islands" provided: "No person for the same offense
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment" and "That the
Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore pro-
vided . . . . subject to the power of said government to change
the practice and method of procedure." In common law countries
an appeal by the prosecution has always been considered incon-
sistent with the provision against double jeopardy. The under-
lying question before the court in Kepner v. United States was
whether the provision against double jeopardy was to be given
the meaning which it has under the common law or that which
it possesses in Spanish procedure. The court by a vote of five
to four decided in favor of the former interpretation.
The dissenting justices were Justices Holmes, White, McKenna
and Brown.
The correctness of the decisions in each of the three "one
judge" decisions last referred to is very doubtful. The arguments
against the first two of these decisions cannot be better stated
than they are in the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in
Dorr v. United States. In regard to the last of these decisions
it may be argued that the right of appeal by the government in
criminal cases, under common law procedure, is held to be
double jeopardy, principally because a new trial means a trial
before a new jury, occasioning an obvious double chance of con-
viction. This reason does not exist under the Spanish criminal
procedure (still in operation in the Philippines in its essential
provisions) where no jury is known, and where the whole pro-
ceedings from the arraignment to the review of the case by the
supreme court constitutes one action, and consequently one
jeopardy. This criticism of the decision in Kepner v. United
1, 195 U. S. 100.
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States would only apply as long as it -is held that islands are not
entitled to jury trials.
We close our list of recent important constitutional law deci-
sions of the United States supreme court with the case of North-
ern Securities Company v. United States.15  Although the
majority of the many legal questions raised in this case were ques-
tions of statutory construction (relative to the true meaning of
Anti-Trust Acts of July 2, i89o) there was a sufficient mixture
of constitutional law problems involved to justify the insertion
of this case under the heading of this article. It is impracticable
here to give anything like a full statement of the questions
involved, or the legal propositions laid down by the court in this
case. Briefly it may be said that it was decided that the Northern
Securities Company, which held more than nine-tenths of the
stock of the Northern Pacific Railway and more than three-
fourths of the stock of the Great Northern Railway (such stock
having been received from the former holders of the stock of
these railways in return for shares in the Northern Securities
Company), was an illegal combination in restraint of interstate
commerce under the prohibition and provisions of the Anti-Trust
Act and that it was within the power of a United States circuit
court in an action brought by the Attorney-General of the United
States after the completion of the transfer of such stock to it,
to enjoin the holding company from voting such stock and from
exercising any control whatever over the acts and doings of the
railroad companies, and also to enjoin the railroad companies
from paying any dividends to the holding corporation on any of
their stock held by it.
The dissenting justices in this case were the Chief Justice, and
Justices Holmes, White and Peckham.
It is not difficult to suggest an explanation of the fact that
upon so many of the questions of constitutional law which have
been recently arising the justices of the supreme court of the
United States have been found to be so nearly equally divided
in opinion. The most fundamental of all the principles of con-
stitutional or statutory construction is that a court in construing
a clause of a constitution or a statute should endeavor to carry
out the intention of the men who drafted and adopted the law.
The application of this principle becomes difficult when a court
is called upon to determine the true intention in the minds of
193 U. S. 197.
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the members of the federal constitutional convention, on a subject
upon which they were notoriously unable to agree at all (e. g.,
the legal tender question) or upon a subject which we may feel
very confident never entered the thoughts of a single member of
the convention (e. g., the proper relation which our Asiatic colo-
nies should bear to the United States). On constitutional ques-
tions of this character a "five to four" division of opinion among
the justices of the supreme court is not surprising.
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